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THE CLEAR FIELD OF CLEARFIELD
By EDWARD DUMBAULD *
F THE familiar-and judicially recognized-practice "whereby unsuccessful
litigants and lawyers give vent to their disappointment in tavern or press '
includes within its scope the more sedate and less bibulous type of discussion
which appears in law reviews, it may be useful to indulge in such comment on a
recent decision2 of the United States Supreme Court which may clarify (or
further confuse) the distinction between the spheres of federal and State law
under the Erie doctrine.'
PRIOR LAW: THE ERIE RULE
The holding in Erie, as is well known,' was -that, when exercising its "diver-
sity jurisdiction",' a federal court must apply State decisional law as well as
State statutory law.' This decision, from the pen of Mr. Justice Brandeis, over-
ruled a long-standing precedent to the contrary ' in which Mr. Justice Story had
* A.B., Princeton University, 1926; LL.B., Harvard University, 1929; LL.M., Harvard
University, 1930; Doctor of Law, University of Leyden, The Netherlands, 1932. Member of the
Pennsylvania, District of Columbia, and United States Supreme Court bars. Secretary of the
American Society of International Law; past president Fayette County Bar Association; former
Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States. Author of INTERIM MEASURES OF
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES (1932); THOMAS JEFFERSON, AMERICAN TOURIST
(1946); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (1950); THE
BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (1957).
'Mr. Justice Franfurter in U.S. v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).
2 Bank of America Natl. Trust & Savings Assn. v. Parnell, - U.S. - , No. 22 October Term,
1956, decided November 13, 1956. The present writer argued the case for respondent; Erwin N.
Griswold, Esq., of Cambridge, Mass., argued for petitioner.
3 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4Of the extensive literature on Erie, attention may be directed to the following: Jackson,
The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A.J. 609 (1938); McCormick and Hewins, The
Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts, 33 ILL. L.R. 126 (1938); Bowman, The Un-
constitutionality of the Rule of Swift v. Tyson, 18 B.U.L.R. 659 (1938); Shulman, The Demise of
Swift v. Tyson, 47 YALE L.J. 1336 (1938); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946).
5 Diversity jurisdiction is that arising under that part of Art. III, sec. 2 of the Constitution
which provides that "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies . . . between Citizens
of different States." It has had many critics and few defenders. It was created because of fear that
State courts might not treat strangers with impartiality. Whether such fear was justified in 1789,
or is justified now, is debatable. On the whole subject see Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L.R. 483 (1928).
6 Statutes were obviously "laws" within the meaning of Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
September 24, 1789, 1 STAT. 73, 92, which provided: "The laws of the several states, except
where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States
in cases where they apply." The substance of this section was carried forward in the 1948 revision
of the Judical Code as 28 U.S.C. 1652, with the substitution of "civil action" for "trials at common
law." That the Erie rule applies in equity cases had been held in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945).
7 Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 18-19 (1842). Besides statutes, under pre-Erie doctrine, the federal
courts applied "local rules of property" established by State courts. See cases cited in note 9 infra.
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spoken for the Court in 1842. The Erie opinion relied upon historical research
by Charles Warren,8 and undertook to 'eliminate the anomalous result long
criticized by Mr. Justice Holmes and others,9 whereby a suit on the same facts
might lead to a different outcome if heard in a federal court instead of in a State
court sitting across the street. Under the Erie rule a federal court in a diversity
case is simply one of the courts of the State in which it sits,"0 and when it applies
the common law of the 'State it must derive such law from the applicable State
decisions " and not fromits own ratiocinations.
The "course pursued" by federal. courts theretofore was condemned as
unconstitutional usurpation of authority 12; the "rules of decision" Act was con-
strued in accordance with Charles Warren's conclusions; and Swift v. Tyson
was added to the long list of discarded precedents.'
3
Later refinements of the Erie rule made it clear that the State law to be
applied included State rules on conflicts of laws,14 res judicata " , statutes of lim-
itations,'8 burden of proving contributory negligence, 17 and similar matters
which would substantially affect the, outcome of the litigation,
8 Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.R. 49,
86-88 (1923). This article was referred to by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in the Taxicab
case cited in note 9 infra.
9 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533 (1928); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1910).
10 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
11 Ascertaining what the applicable law of the State is may present problems. The general
principle is that the federal court must approach the question exactly as a State court would.
Hence it will in the absence of* controlling authority apply decisions of lower courts and those
from other jurisdictions, giving them the same weight as a State court would. See Fidelity Union
Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177-79 (1940); Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234,
237 (1943); Clark, loc. cit. note 4 supra, at 291. The Erie rule does not require that federal
judges abdicate their judical function and serve as a glorified law clerk or "ventriloquist's dummy."
Ibid. 284.
12 304 U.S. at 77-78. Mr. Justice Reed withheld assent to that aspect of the opinion. Ibid.
90-92. Commentators were also skeptical as to the necessity for deciding a constitutional question.
McCormick and Hewins, loc. cit. note 4 supra, at 134, suggest that perhaps a majority of the Court
were not willing to upset, as a question of statutory construction, the long-settled determination
made in Swift v. Tyson. See also FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT, 73 (1950).
The unconstitutionality of the "course pursued" before Erie 'by the federal courts doubtless consisted
in the exercise of ungranted powers, in violation of the Tenth Amendment, upon the assumption
that the dederal judiciary 'has no power in an area where Congress has no power to legislate. But
as Justice Reed pointed out, Article III of the Constitution plus the "necessary and proper clause"
has sufficed as the basis of admiralty law, and might also empower Congress to prescribe the substan-
tive law applicable in diversity cases. The presence of a constitutional question was intimated by
some members of the Court in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956). Justice Rut-
ledge believed that the Erie rule 'had no constitutional basis. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 558 (1949).
18 Lists of overruled decisions of the United States Supreme Court are compiled in Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-407 (1932); and in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 665 (1944). See also DUNHAM, MR. JUSTICE, 65 (1956).
14 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 503
(1941).
"I Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 189 (1947).
18 Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533 (1949).
17 Sampson v. Channell, 110 F. (2d) 754, 758, 762 (C.C.A. 1, (1940); Cities Service Oil
Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939).
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PRIOR LAW: FEDERAL QUESTIONS
But numerous decisions of the Supreme Court demonstrate that in spite of
the exorcism of "general federal common law" in Erie, there remains an exten-
sive area of "independent federal judicial decision" outside the constitutional
realm. 8
Within this area, whenever federal courts have occasion to decide a fed-
eral question which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone, they must
fashion a rule appropriate to give effect to the policy of governing legislation,
and to this end may apply the traditional common-law technique of decision
and draw upon all the source materials of the common law."9
Legal consequences radiating from federal policy and the "sweep" of
federal statutes are to be determined as a matter of federal common law, if one
chooses to call it such, rather than of State law under the Erie doctrine. This
is true when the controversy arises under the diversity jurisdiction as well as
when it falls within some other jurisdictional category. Thus in a diversity
suit brought by the licensor of a patent to enforce the terms of the license agree-
ment, the Supreme Court held that the licensee could assert as a defense that
the license contained price-fixing provisions violative of the federal antitrust
laws, and that the licensee was not bound by an estoppel under State law by
reason of having accepted a license under the patent.
"It is familiar doctrine that the prohibition of a federal statute may not be set
at naught, or its benefits denied, by state statues or state common law rules. In
such a case our decision is not controlled 'by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . . But the
doctrine of that case is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which
the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal rela-
tions which they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its source
in those statutes, rather than by local law . . . . When a federal statute condemns an
act as unlawful the extent and nature of the legal consequences of the condemnation,
though left by the statute to judicial determination are nevertheless federal questions,
the answers to which are to be derived from the statute and the federal policy which
it has adopted. To the federal statute and policy, conflicting state law and policy
must yield." 20
18 U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 308 (1947).
9 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 457-59, 469-72 (1942); Deitrick v.
Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 201 (1940).
20 Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942). In Scott Paper Co.
v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945), the Court held that: "The nature and extent
of the legal consequences of the expiration of a patent are federal questions, the answers to which
are to be derived from the patent laws and the policies which they adopt." On the other hand,
a suit to enforce a licensing agreement and revest the granted rights in the licensor because of
licensee's breach of the agreement is a suit on the contract and not a suit under the patent laws.
Wilson v. Sandford, 10 How. 99, 101 (1850); Wade v. Lawder, 165 U.S. 624, 628 (1897);
Luckett v. Delpark, 270 U.S. 496, 502-503 (1926).
1957;]
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In another leading case,2 ' a broker who had sold defaulted bonds to a
bank gave the bank a note to be carried in place of the defaulted bonds as an
asset of the bank. The bank's receipt for the note stated "This note is given
with the understanding that it will not be called for payment." The original
note was signed in St. Louis, Mo., and delivered to the bank in Illinois. The
evidence did not show where the renewal note was signed, though it was dated
at Belleville, Illinois. These transactions occurred prior to the passage of the
legislation insuring bank deposits.22 The question was whether the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation could collect on the notes or whether its rights
were subject to the original understanding with the bank that the notes were
never to be paid. The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of federal law, the
legislation of Congress disclosed a federal policy that the F.D.I.C. should be
protected against misrepresentations with respect to the status of the assets of
insured banks.2 The broker was responsible for the creation of the false status,
and should be liable for its continuance after the deposit insurance legislation
went into effect.2
A similar case arising under the National Bank Act had already empha-
sized the principle that judicial determination of the legal consequences which
flow from acts regulated by federal legislation is a matter of federal and not
State law. There a bank director gave a note to the bank which was substituted
for certain stock illegally held by the bank. It was understood that the bank
was to continue to own the stock and that the note would never be paid. The
Court held that the provisions of the National Bank Act constituted a complete
system which could not be defeated by the attempted maneuver: "It is the
federal statute which condemns as unlawful respondent's acts. The extent and
nature of the legal consequences of this condemnation, though left by the stat-
ute to judicial determination, are nevertheless to be derived from it and the fed-
eral policy which it has adopted." 25
A particularly enlightening exposition of the nature of the doctrine calling
for application of federal law where a federal subject matter is involved was
given in U. S. v. Standard Oil Co. 21 In that case a soldier had been injured as
a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the defendant. Hos-
pitalization expenses which would have been recoverable from the defendant
21 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447 (1942). This case did not arise under
diversity jurisdiction -but under a provision of the Act establishing the federal corporation which
empowered it to sue or be sued "in any court of law or equity, State or Federal." Ibid. 455.
22 Ibid. 454, 459.
23 Ibid. 456-59.
24 Ibid. 461.
25 Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-201 (1940).
26 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
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by a civilian plaintiff were borne by the Government because the soldier's mili-
tary status entitled him to such hospitalization privileges. The Government
attempted to introduce an innovation in tort liability by bringing against the
negligent defendant an action analogous to the husband's or father's remedy for
a wrong done to his wife or daughter per quod servitium amisit.
The Court declined to recognize the existence of such liability, but before
reaching the topic of tort liability vel non concluded that that issue presented a
question determinable as a matter of federal law and not State law. In that
connection, the Court cited the Clearfield case, to be discussed subsequently, and
emphasized that the principle underlying that case was not limited to determin-
ation of the rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper issued
by it. The Court said: "Although the Clearfield case applied these principles
to a situation involving contractual relations of the Government, they are equally
applicable in the facts of this case where the relations affected are non-
contractual or tortious in character." 27
Discussing the federal character of the subject matter involved in the rela-
tionship between the soldier and his sovereign, the Court said "as the Federal
Government has the exclusive power to establish and define the relationship by
virtue of its military and other powers, equally clearly it has power in execution
of the same functions to protect the relation once formed from harms inflicted
by others." The hospitalization expenses also involved the Government's fiscal
powers. "Indeed in this aspect, the case is not greatly different from the
Clearfield case or from one involving the Government's paramount power of
control over its own property, both to prevent its unauthorized use or destruc-
tion and to secure indemnity for those injuries." "8 The Court made plain that
the Erie rule did not have the effect of "broadening State power over matters
essentially of federal character." 29
That recognition of an appropriate area for the operation of "federal com-
mon law" of the type of which we have been speaking is not incompatible with
proper respect for the Erie doctrine is shown by the fact that Hinderlider v.
La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,30 was decided on the same day
as Erie, and the opinion was likewise by Mr. Justice Brandeis. The Hinderlider
case involved apportionment of the water flowing in an interstate stream.
This subject matter was recognized by the Court as constituting another appro-




30 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
1957.)
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sion involved the sacrifice of private property rights granted by the State law
of Colorado."
Liability or immunity of a telegraph company for transmission of libelous
messages has likewise been recognized as a field "where legal relations are gov-
erned by a 'federal common law' developed by the federal courts untrammeled
by state court decisions," notwithstanding Erie. 2 The same result was reached
with respect to liability of a common carrier for mental anguish caused by its
delay in delivering a coffin and grave-lothes in time for the funeral of the
shipper's wife."3
Public lands and Indian affairs form another important field of subject
matter where federal law controls.8
Bankruptcy is another area where a uniform federal rule regulates the
proof and allowance of claims and the distribution of assets. 5 Railway labor
litigation is likewise a field where the rule applies that a right based upon a
duty imposed by a federal statute is a federal right, derived from federal legis-
lation and the policy which it embodies.386
Government contracts, and transactions where the United States is exercising
a power granted to it by the Constitution, furnish another instance of subject-
matter governed by federal law, In an often-cited case the Court said:
"The purpose of the supremacy clause was to avoid the introduction of dispari-
ties, confusions and conflicts which would follow if the Government's general
authority were subject to local controls. The validity and construction of contracts
through which the United States is exercising its constitutional functions, their conse-
quences on the rights and obligations of the parties, the titles or liens which they
create or permit, all present questions of federal law not controlled by the law of
any state." 37
U'Ibid. 110.
32 O'Brien v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 113 F. 2d 539, 541 (C.C.A. 1, 1940). Here,
although there were no specific statutory provisions governing liability for libel, "Congress having
occupied the field by enacting a fairly comprehensive scheme of regulation, it seems clear that
questions relating to the duties, privileges and liabilities of telegraph companies in the transmission
of interstate messages must be governed by uniform federal rules."
. 83 So. Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612, 614-15 (1916). See also Illinois Steel Co. v. B. & 0.
R. Co., 320 U.S. 508, 511 (1944).
34 U.S. v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1947); Jackson County v. U. S., 308 U.S.
343, 350 (1939); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Utah Power & Light Co. v.
U.S., 243 U.S. 389, 403-405 (1917).
3 Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 732 (1946); Wragg v. Fed. Land Bank, 317 U.S. 525,
528 (1943).
36 Steele v. L. & N. R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944).
3 U.S. v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 177, 183 (1944). On the federal law of govern-
ment contracts, see also Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); U.S. v. Standard
Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106, 111 (1944); U.S. v. Ansonia Brass and Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452, 462
(1910); Royal Indemnity Co. v. U.S., 313 U.S. 389, 296 (1941).
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Government obligations such as bonds and commercial paper constitute
an important category of government contracts which is of special interest and
will subsequently be discussed under a separate beading.
Enough has been said here to show that, notwithstanding the Erie rule,
there are many important areas of litigation in which, even in a case arising
under diversity jurisdiction, s" the inherent nature of the subject matter calls for
application of decisional law independently fashioned by federal courts. This
may properly be called federal common law. It is a different animal from the
type of federal common law which was discarded in Erie. It is not the sort of
"brooding omnipresence in the sky" which Mr. Justice Holmes condemned."
It emanates from the "articulate voice" of a particular identifiable jurisdiction,
that is to say, ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United States.
This species of law is not incompatible with the objectives of the Erie doc-
trine. The purpose of Erie is to produce the same decision in a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction as would be reached if the case were brought in
a State court. This purpose is not defeated when federal law is applied because
the case involves a federal subject matter. In such a case the federal court is
simply elaborating by means of the customary common-law judicial technique
the specific legal consequences of a federal policy embodied within the "sweep"
of federal legislation. In such a case, the governing federal rule would be
applied even if the case arose in a State court.' ° Why then should it not apply
when the case is heard by a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction?
The situation is well summarized in the following comment:
"Thus it can be seen that, although the Erie decision retains its .vigor with
respect to cases involving no federally created rights, there has developed a body
of law embracing apparent exceptions to its rule. If the case involves rights under
an obligation of the United States, if the rights involved arise under a federal statute,
or if the policy of a federal statute requires uniformity in the field in which the
particular action lies, federal common law will be applied. These apparent excep-
tions to the Erie decision however, serve to carry out its policy of uniformity. The
application of federal law results in consistency of decision among the federal
courts. Since state courts also apply federal law in these same situations, the pattern
of uniformity is completed." 41
s8 Indeed, the type of federal common law of which we are speaking is applicable ratione
materiae and would be given effect even in a State court which had occasion to pass. upon such
a federal question. See note 40 infra.
39 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917).
40K.C.S. Ry. Co. v. Van Zant, 260 U.S. 459, 468 (1923); Hannum v. Amsterdam Casualty
Co., 330 Pa. 353 (1938); Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409-11 (1953); Garrett v.
Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 245-49 (1942).
41 Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of Federal Common Law, 59 HARV. L.R. 966,
976 (1946). See also Eisenhart, Federal Decisional Law Independent of State Common Law Since
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 9 G. WASH. L.R. 465 (1941); Reifenberg, Common Law-Federal, 30
1957.1
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Indeed, as Judge Learned Hand observed, it has now become dangerous
to rely on State law in any matter where a federal agency is involved. 2
PRIOR LAW: GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS
Every transaction in which the United States pays its debts or borrows
money is an exercise of a constitutionally granted function.4"
An important case dealing with negotiable instruments issued by the gov-
ernment, Clearfield Trust Co. v. U. S., 4 was decided in 1943. In that case a
government check had been issued by the proper government official to pay
a WPA worker. The check was cashed by an unauthorized person under a
forged endorsement at a Penney store in connection with a sale of merchandise.
The check was paid by the government upon presentation by a bank which
guaranteed prior endorsements. The payee discovered and reported the for-
gery on November 30, 1936. No notice was given to the bank until January
12, 1937. When suit was brought by the government to obtain reimburse-
ment under the bank's guarantee of all prior endorsements, the trial court dis-
missed the action on the basis of a rule of State law in Pennsylvania relieving
the innocent endorser if the drawee fails to give immediate notice upon dis-
covery of the forgery. This ruling was reversed. The Supreme Court held
that State law did not apply to the subject matter under consideration. The
Court said:
"The rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it
issues are governed by federal rather than local law. When the United States dis-
burses its funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a constitutional function or power.
* . . The authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and the
statutes of the United States and was in no way dependent on the laws of Pennsyl-
vania or of any other state. . . . The duties imposed upon the United States
and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots in the same
federal sources. . . . In the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the
federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.
.. .The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale and
OREGON L.R. 164 (1951). Counsel in the Bank of America case also had the benefit of a paper on
Development of Federal Common Law under the Clearfield Trust Doctrine, delivered by Paul J.
Mishkin, of University of Pennsylvania Law School, at the Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit
on September 12, 1956, which will be revised and published shortly.
42 "Recent decisions of the Supreme Court make it apparent that state statutes and state de-
cisions are an unsafe reliance in dealing with the rights and liabilities of corporations, which are
federal agencies, even though they be organized under a state law, and made subject to suit like
a private corporation." N.Y., N.H. & H. R. Co. v. R.F.C., 180 F. 2d 241, 244 (C.C.A. 2, 1950).
43 Const., Art. I, sec. 8, pars. 1 and 2. Hence the validity and construction of such transactions,
"their consequences on the rights and obligations of the parties, the titles or liens which they
create or permit, all present questions of federal law not controlled by the law of any state."
322 U.S. at 183, quoted in text at note 37 supra.
4 318 U.S. 363 (1943). This case has been frequently cited as a precedent. See, for example,
text at notes 27 and 28 supra.
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transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly occur in several
states. The application of state law, even without the conflict of laws rules of the
forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional un-
certainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by making identical transactions
subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The desirability of a uniform
rule is plain." 45
This decision was something of an innovation. The theory that federal
law should govern with respect to the liability of parties to government checks
apparently originated some time during the decade preceding Clearfield, for as
late as 1934 government counsel had argued that the law of the District of
Columbia, where such a check had been issued and was payable, should be
applied; or else the law of New York, where a presenting bank had executed
its endorsement.
48
Moreover, Clearfield seems to conflict with the principle that when the
government descends from its sphere of sovereignty into the arena of commerce,
it is subject to the same rules as private parties.47  Nowhere could that prin-
ciple more appropriately be given effect, one would suppose, than when the
government engages in the commonplace and routine transaction of issuing
a check. Such a transaction involves none of the peculiarities incident to other
types of government contracts, which require a special regime (such as com-
petitive bidding requirements, renegotiation of excessively profitable war con-
tracts, construction of public buildings, warships, or atomic energy installations,
manufacture of supplies to meet government specifications, and the like). If
the Government anywhere stands on the same footing as other parties in its
dealings, it would seem that it should do so when engaging in the simple clerical
activity of issuing a check.
Nevertheless Clearfield has been followed without deviation, and also
been cited as a procreative precedent in litigation dealing with other areas gov-
erned by federal law.
45 318 U.S. at 366-67.
46 U.S. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340, 345, 347, 348 (1934). The government had
mailed the check to a payee in Yugoslavia. Under the law of that country, where a forged endorse-
ment was made, a bona fide purchaser got good title. The Court held that the law of Yugoslavia
governed, invoking the conflict of laws rule that title to a chattel brought into a jurisdiction with
the consent of the owner was subjected to the provisions of the law there in effect. Ibid. 346. This
rule was a favorite theory of the late Professor Joseph H. Beale, who often cited Edgerly v. Bush,
81 N.Y. 199 (1880), a case where the title of a purchaser of horses taken into Canada and sold
without the owner's consent was not recognized. 1 BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAws, 294, 501 (1935); 2 id. 996.47 U.S. v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106, 111 (1944); U.S. v. Natl. Exchange Bank, 270
U.S. 527, 534 (1926); U.S. v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328, 339-40 (1924); The Siren, 7 Wall.
152, 154 (1868). In U.S. v. First Natl. Bank of Albuquerque, 131 F. 2d 985, 987 (C.C.A. 10,
1942), this principle is proclaimed (as the basis of applying the "impostor" rule) and Clearfield
is cited on the same page of the opinion.
1957.1
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National Metropolitan Bank v. U. S.,"8 differs from the Clearfield case in
that the government checks there involved were procured to be issued by the
fraud of a government employee through the use of forged travel vouchers.
He added forged endorsements of the payees and his own endorsement, and
cashed the checks at a bank. That bank guaranteed all prior endorsements and
forwarded the checks to the National Metropolitan Bank, which made a similar
endorsement, as required by Treasury regulations, in order to obtain payment
from the government. In this case the Clearfield rule was followed, and the
Court held that legal questions involved in controversies over government com-
mercial paper are to be solved by application of federal rather than State law.
What of government bonds, another common type of government obliga-
tion? Here it has long been a well settled proposition that federal law regulates
the right to ownership of such securities, and that Treasury regulations which
are accorded the force of law may validly attach to such obligations the status
of non-transferability. 9
THE INSTANT CASE
In the Bank of America case, the issue was whether federal law governed
the process of transmitting government coupon bonds through the channels
of the Federal Reserve System for redemption. The Supreme Court's decision
was that it did not.
The facts were as follows: Petitioner, a San Francisco bank, alleging di-
versity of citizenship, brought suit in the District Court of the Western Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania against four defendants, charging each of them with con-
version of a number of bearer bonds which had disappeared on May 2, 1944,
while the bank was getting them ready to present for payment. The bonds
had been called on May 1, 1944, but by their terms were due to mature on
May 1, 1952. Under Treasury Regulations they were treated as government
obligations, and were payable at any Federal Reserve Bank.
One of the four defendants, a lawyer named Parnell, was consulted in
September, 1948, by one Rocco, the other individual defendant. Rocco's family
had been clients of Parnell's firm, and Rocco sought advice regarding estab-
lishment of an automobile distributorship and a coal stripping operation. For
these ventures he stated that he wished to turn some bonds into cash, and re-
quested Parnell to handle the transaction at the First National Bank in Indiana,
of which Parnell was a director. This bank was the third defendant in the
48 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945).
49U.S. v. Janowitz, 257 U.S. 42, 45 (1921); U.S. v. Sacks, 257 U.S. 37, 41 (1921); U.S.
v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 50 F. Supp. 73, 75-77 (M. D. Pa. 1943); Guldager v. U.S., 204
F. 2d 487, 489 (C.C.A. 6, 1953).
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case. It received the bonds from Parnell, and immediately sent them by regis-
tered mail to the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (the fourth defendant),
which as fiscal agent of the United States for the payment of such bonds effected
such payment, in accordance with Treasury Regulations, by crediting the account
of the Bank in Indiana. That bank then issued to Parnell a cashier's check for
the amount collected (less a few dollars for expenses). Parnell cashed this
check at the bank and turned the proceeds in currency over to his client Rocco
(less a fee for his services). ° Subsequently it was learned that these bonds
were among those which had disappeared from the plaintiff bank in San Fran-
cisco in 1944.
The trial court dismissed the action against the Federal Reserve Bank. A
verdict was rendered against the other defendants. Rocco did not appeal. By
a 4 to 3 decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, direct-
ing entry of judgment in favor of the Bank in Indiana and a new trial in the
case of Parnell.
The majority opinion pointed out that it was wrong to treat the case as
"an ordinary, garden variety, diversity of citizenship case," as the trial court
had done, applying the Erie rule.5 ' The Clearfield case, on the other hand,
in the view of the Court of Appeals, compelled the conclusion that "where
United States bonds are concerned, we must look to federal law to determine
not only the nature of the obligations, rights, and duties of the United States
as a party, but also the rights and duties of holders and transferees of such
bonds among each other." 5
If federal law governed, it followed that under the holding in Murray v.
Lardner,"8 "the purchaser of coupon bonds before due, without notice and in
good faith, is unaffected by want of title in the seller, and the burden of proof
in regard to notice and want of good faith is on the claimant as against the
purchaser." " Accordingly, as there was no evidence of bad faith insofar as
the Bank in Indiana was concerned, "plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of
proof." Likewise, Parnell was entitled to a new trial "because of improper
instructions" by the trial court regarding the burden of proof under federal
"o There was a conflict between Parnell's and Rocco's testimony as to whether the fee was nom-
inal or substantial. Non constat whether any part of it was for services in connection with cashing the
bonds or whether all of it was for the other legal matters regarding which Parnell had been con-
sulted by Rocco.
51 Bank of America Natl. Trust & Savings Assn. v. Rocco, 226 F. 2d, 299 (C.C.A. 3, 1955).
52 226 F. 2d at 299.
53 2 Wall. 110, 121 (1864).
54 226 F. 2d at 300.
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law. Since these errors necessitated reversal there was no need to consider
other points raised by the defendants.5
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, reversed,
stating that "The Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of this litigation
in holding that the Clearfield Trust case controlled." 1 The Clearfield doc-
trine was apparently limited so as to apply only where "the rights and duties
of the United States" are involved and would be subjected to undue uncertainty
if State law were to govern. The matters involved in the instant case were
deemed "transactions essentially of local concern" with no "federal interest"
present.
The Court said:
"The present litigation is purely between private parties and does not touch
the rights and duties of the United States. The only possible interest of the United
States in a situation like the one here, exclusively involving the transfer of Govern.
ment paper between private persons, is that the floating of securities of the
United States might somehow or other be adversely affected by the local rule of a
particular State regarding the liability of a converter. This is far too speculative,
far too remote a possibility to justify the application of federal law to transactions
essentially of local concern.
"We do not mean to imply that litigation with respect to Government paper
necessarily precludes the presence of a federal interest, to be governed by federal
law, in all situations merely because it is a suit between private parties, or that it
is beyond the range of federal legislation to deal comprehensively with Government
paper. We do not of course foreclose such judicial or legislative action in appropriate
situations by concluding that this controversy over burden of proof and good faith
represents too essentially a private transaction not to be dealt with by the local law
of Pennsylvania where the transactions took place. Federal law of course governs the
interpretation of the nature of the rights and obligations created by the Government
bonds themselves. A decision with respect to the "overdueness" of the bonds is
therefore a matter of federal law, which, in view of our holding, we need not
elucidate.
"This conclusion requires reversal of the judgments of the Court of Appeals but
not reinstatement of the judgments of the District Court." 57
55 Ibid. at 302. Since the Supreme Court's reversal of the Court of Appeals, as will be noted,
leaves open various other points in the case, discussion in this article is limited to the single
question which was decided by the Supreme Court (regarding applicability of federal or State
law). This is the question which "raised an important issue of federal-state relations" and
impelled the granting of certiorari. - U.S. at
r)6- U.S. at . According to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion the basis for the
Clearfield decision had been stated "with unclouded explicitness" in the sixth and seventh sentences
of the passage quoted in text at note 44 supra. - U.S. at -.
57 - U.S. at - Accordingly the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings. In speaking of "overdueness" the Court has in mind the question whether
the bonds became overdue on the date of call, or not until the date of maturity. The latter view
is taken in Morgan v. U.S., 113 U.S. 476, 501 (1885). Petitioner contended that this ruling was
weakened by language in Smyth v. U.S., 302 U.S. 329, 353 (1937). See Brief for Petitioner, 42;
Brief for Respondent, 50-56.
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Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in an opinion of two
paragraphs:
"We believe that the 'federal law merchant', which Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367, held applicable to transactions in the commercial
paper of the United States, should be applicable to all transactions in that paper. In-
deed we said in National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456,
that 'legal questions involved in controversies over such commercial papers are to be
resolved by the application of federal rather than local law.' Not until today has
a distinction been drawn between suits by the United States on that paper and suits
by other parties to it. But the Court does not stop there. Because this is 'essentially
a private transaction,' it is to be governed by local law. Yet the nature of the rights
and obligations created by commercial paper of the United States, should be appli-
cable to all transactions in that paper. Indeed we said in National Metropolitan
Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456, that 'legal questions involved in contro-
versies over such commercial papers are to be resolved by the application of federal
rather than local law.' Not until today has a distinction been drawn between suits
by the United States on that paper and suits by other parties to it. But the Court
does not stop there. Because this is 'essentially a private transaction,' it is to be
governed by local law. Yet the nature of the rights and obligations created by com-
mercial paper of the United States Government is said to be controlled by federal
law. Thus, federal law is to govern some portion of a dispute between private par-
ties, while that portion of the dispute which is 'essentially of local concern' is to
be governed by local law. The uncertainties which inhere in such a dichotomy are
obvious. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205; Davis v. Department
of Labor, 317 U.S. 239.
"The virtue of a uniform law governing bonds, notes, and other paper issued
by the United States is that it provides a certain and definite guide to the rights
of all parties rather than subjecting them to the vagaries of the law of many States.
The business of the United States will go on without that uniformity. But the
policy surrounding our choice of law is concerned with the convenience, certainty,
and definiteness in having one set of rules governing the rights of all parties to
government paper, as contrasted to multiple rules. If the rule of the Clearfield
Trust case is to be abandoned as to some parties, it should be abandoned as to all
and we should start afresh on this problem." "
What is the state of the law after the decision in the Bank of America
case?
CONTENTIONS OF COUNSEL
To appraise the result of the decision it may be helpful to analyze some
of the arguments advanced by counsel in their briefs. As Thomas Jefferson
remarked with reference to amendments made in the Declaration of Inde-
58 - U.S. at .
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pendence during its consideration by Congress, "the sentiments of men are
known not only by what they receive, but what they reject also." "
. 1. Exercise of constitutional function. Federal law governs transactions
which constitute the exercise of a constitutionally conferred power. When the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland redeemed the bonds involved in the Bank
of America case, it was acting as fiscal agent and paying a debt of the United
States. This was the exercise of a constitutionally conferred power. Even
the plaintiff did not seriously contest the correctness of the trial court's ruling
that the Federal Reserve Bank was not liable for conversion of the bonds when
it redeemed them. Treasury Regulations in force clearly provided that the
government would pay no attention to caveats and would assume no responsi-
bility with respect, to stolen coupon bonds.
If, then, the transaction of redemption is the exercise of a constitutional
power and is governed by federal law, with respect to one party to the trans-
action (the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland), how can it be something else
and governed by different law, with respect to the other party to the same trans-
action (the forwarding bank, the Bank in Indiana) ?
Moreover, counsel argued, since redemption is a federal (indeed a con-
stitutional) function, and the transactions in which the forwarding bank en-
gaged were merely incidents of -the redemption process, the entire chain of
events should be governed by the same law. The bank served simply as a
"conduit" or instrumentality for effectuating redemption, just as did the postal
employees who handled the registered letter enclosing the bonds. Suit might
have been brought against the mail carrier who delivered the bonds to the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank with as much propriety as against the forwarding bank.
2. Nature of the power exercised. If paying a debt of the United States
by issuing a check for the amount due is a federally regulated exercise of a
constitutionally conferred power, it would seem that a fortiori the same would
be true when a government bond is redeemed.
"If the concept of federal law is applied to the Clearfield situation, it should
a fortiori be applied to the situation involved in the case at bar. For the Govern-
ment's power to become a party to commercial paper is not inherent but is purely
the creature of statute. The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666 (1868). But the
power to borrow money is not only specifically embodied in the Constitution (Art. I,
sec. 8, par. 2; Art. VI, par. 1), but was exercised, before adoption of that instru-
ment, by the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War. Our national
59 DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY. 18
(1950). See also Kaplan, Use of Appellate Records and Briefs Necessary for Full Grasp of Cases,
23 HARV. LAW RECORD 3 (Nov. 29, 1956).
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independence is rooted upon exercise of the borrowing power. Alexander Hamil-
ton's fame as a statesman rests upon his federal policy with respect to the public
debt. His parting of the ways with James Madison was due to disagreement over
the rights to be accorded as a matter of federal policy to transferees of the obliga-
tions evidencing public debt (in other words, the very subject matter which petitioner
here contends is of no concern to the Government, because it involves only trans-
actions affecting the rights of private parties inter sese). Irving Brant, James
Madison, III, 290-95 (1950). It is unnecessary to say how important it is in the
present era of 'deficit financing' to maintain unimpaired the federal Government's
complete authority with respect to policy concerning types of securities to be issued
and indeed every aspect of management of the public debt." 80
3. The language in CLEARFIELD applies. The passage in Clearfield which
Mr. Justice Frankfurter himself quotes says of government commercial paper
that "transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly occur
in several states." 61 This language shows that the Clearfield rule was meant
to govern transactions to which the United States itself was not a party. Issu-
ance and payment would be transactions to which the United States is a party.
But when the Court spoke of intermediate transactions ("from issuance to
payment") it was necessarily referring to transactions between other parties
inter sese.
4. The facts in CLEARFIELD are similar. Moreover, the very transaction
which created liability in Clearfield (the endorsement of the check by the bank)
was an intermediate transaction by a private party. It is true, of course, that
in Clearfield the government was involved as the beneficiary of that transac-
tion, seeking to hold the bank liable on its endorsement. But the endorsement
itself was not a transaction in which the United States participated.
5. The reasoning in CLEARFIELD applies. In the two sentences of the
Clearfield opinion which immediately follow the two sentences quoted by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, the Court stated the reason for the applicability of federal
law: the desirability of a uniform rule."
Accordingly, the subject matter, not the identity of the parties to the case,
is the determinative factor. The Court does not fashion rules of federal law
merely to give the government an advantage over private parties in law suits.
It may well be that in many cases the effect of applying federal law would be
advantageous to the claims of the government, but in other cases this would
60 Brief for Respondent, 19-20.
61 318 U.S. at 367. Italics supplied.
62 See the last two sentences of the passage quoted in text at note 44 supra.
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not be true. 3 In any event that factor is not the reason which impels the Court
to apply federal rather than State law.
The considerations of public policy which indicate the desirability of uni-
formity in connection with a federal subject matter are very similar to the con-
siderations which must be weighed by the Court in determining when uni-
formity is desirable in the familiar fields of interstate commerce and admiralty."
6. Federal interest in public debt structure. Just as it was held in the
Standard Oil case '5 that the government may protect by federal law the soldier-
sovereign relationship which it created, counsel in the Bank of America case
argued that the government may protect by federal law the status of nego-
tiability which is given by Congress to the bearer bonds here involved.
It has long been well-settled law that Treasury Regulations having the
force of law may validly attach to government obligations the status of non-
transferability."8
In the light of these analogies, it was argued that:
"The government has the same power to prescribe that bonds shall be trans-
ferable as it has to prescribe that they shall not be. The integrity of the nation's fiscal
system is involved to the same extent under either alternative and the government
has the same vital interest in protecting the functioning of the type of financial struc-
ture which it has established ...
"The Congress, and the Secretary of the Treasury through regulations having
the force of law, have determined that these bonds should be issued in bearer form
and that they should be transferable by delivery. The legal consequence of such
determination is not merely that the bonds may be discharged by payment to the
person presenting them (indeed that subject is separately covered elsewhere in the
Regulations) but also that in transactions in the market place between other
parties inter sese the bonds may safely be dealt with as bearer securities which
can be transferred freely like currency or negotiable instruments." 67
7. State regulation of assignment could impair negotiability. The integ-
rity of the federal government's decisions whether a particular bond issue was
to be negotiable or non-transferable would be impaired if the transactions of
assignment were subject to regulation by State law." The States would be at
63 As said in U.S. v. Matthews, 139 F. Supp. 683, 690 (N. D. Calif. 1956): "What is sauce
for the federal plaintiff as gander ought to be sauce for it when it is the goose."
64 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917); Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 651 (1953): Stevens, Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 HARV. L.R. 246 (1950).
65 332 U.S. at 306. See text at note 28 supra.
66 See note 49 supra.
67 Brief for Respondent, 35, 46-47.
68 The dissenting judges in the Court of Appeals conceded that federal law governed the
assignability of government bonds, but they believed that State law determined whether a given
transaction was operative as an effective assignment. 226 F. 2d at 303.
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liberty to frustrate and defeat entirely the negotiable status which the federal
government sought to attach to this type of obligations. For example:
"If Pennsylvania or any other State should come to think that thefts of govern-
ment bonds were so numerous as to create a problem similar to that presented by
stolen automobiles, such State would be perfectly free to provide that no government
bearer bond within its jurisdiction could be transferred without endorsement of
the names and addresses of the parties, and could also provide that before such a
transaction of assignment should be valid a certificate must be obtained from the
Secretary of the Commonwealth or the head of the State Police that no claim was on
file that such bonds had been stolen. It is very plain that such a system of analogiz-
ing the sale of government bearer bonds to the sale of an automobile with the
title registered in the State capital would completely frustrate the federal policy
of protecting the readily negotiable quality of its bearer bonds." 69
8. State could transform status of bonds. The Court of Appeals had
emphasized what was perhaps the strongest reason in favor of application of
federal law:
"The desirability of having uniformity of results in a determination of the
rights of transferees of such bonds is just as important as having uniformity in a
determination of the rights and liabilities of the United States, a party to the orig-
inal obligation, so that the vast amounts of government bonds presently in circula-
tion can be free of the myriad of doubts which would arise if the rights of the trans-
ferees must be determined by the several and diverse laws of the states, for then a
purchaser of such bonds would, of necessity, in each case have to make inquiry as
to the prior route taken by the bonds." 70
In elaboration of this point, counsel contended:
"This disadvantage would be experienced whether or not the States under-
took to pass restrictive legislation of the sort mentioned above. Simply as a mat-
ter of making certain what rights were created in transferees under the applicable
State laws, it would be necessary for the purchaser of negotiable bonds to have a
record of the prior transactions and of the places where they occurred. The need for
preserving such a pedigree of the prior transfers and lineage of the bonds would
in fact result in a complete transformation of the nature of the instruments them-
selves.
"Instead of being freely negotiable bearer bonds they would in fact be instru-
ments passing under endorsements, and the endorsements would have to show the
time and place of each transaction. To require such an Odyssey describing the way-
farings of each of the myriad government bonds in circulation would inevitably
paralyze the market for such securities and interfere with the discretion of the fed-
eral government to determine whether a particular issue of obligations should be
negotiable bearer bonds or registered or non-transferable bonds . . Bearer bonds,
69 Brief for Respondent, 35-36.
70 226 F. 2d at 299.
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, as we have known them in the past, would be eliminated. The Treasury would be
limited to issuance of securities having the characteristic features of registered or non-
transferable bonds." 71
9. Negotiability a valuable feature. Marketability of government bonds
would be impaired by State interference amounting to annihilation of the dis-
tinctive features of bearer bonds.
"Much of the value of certain types of government bonds depends upon their
free transferability and the willingness of subsequent parties to engage in dealings
with respect to such bonds. The value of the bonds to the original purchaser is
thus dependent upon the rules of law protecting subsequent parties who act in good
faith in participating in transactions with respect to such bonds. If such parties
may not safely engage in such transactions, the value of the bond to the first pur-
chaser and its salability by the government is materially affected.
"That purchasers 'desire readily transferable and negotiable bonds, and are
willing to run the attendant risks in order to obtain the advantageous features de-
sired, is shown by statistics with regard to the volume of bearer bonds outstanding in
proportion to the volume of other types of securities." 72
CONCLUSIONS
Several conclusions can be drawn from what the Court's opinion in the
Bank of America case contains, in the light of the contentions that were brought
to the Court's attention in briefs and argument:
1. The clear field for application of Clearfield has been limited. The test
for determining where the boundaries of such application are located has not
been made plain, however. Indeed, that problem has been further confused.
It is still safe to say with Judge Learned Hand that it is unsafe to rely on State
law in matters where dealings with the government are concerned, or govern-
ment obligations are involved. But the case decides that federal law does not
apply undiscriminatingly to all questions arising from dealings with respect
to government obligations.
It may be that Clearfield will henceforth be applicable only when "the
rights and duties of the United States" itself are in dispute. But this seems
unlikely, since the Court makes an express reservation that "in appropriate
situations" federal law might control: "We do not mean to imply that liti-
gation with respect to Government paper necessarily precludes the presence
71 Brief for Respondent, 37, 40.
72 Brief for Respondent, 33-34. Current treasury regulations contain a recital that 90% of
transferable government -bonds are in bearer form. The volume of transferable bonds outstanding
is over twice the amount of nontransferable issues. This indicates that investors prize the feature
of ready transferability and to procure it are willing to take the attendant risks (minimized by
insurance and custodial precautions).
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of a federal interest, to be governed by federal law, in all situations merely
because it is a suit between private parties." "1
Of course, actually, it was never contended by counsel in the Bank of
America case that all questions involving government bonds were controlled
by federal law. In cases where there is a dispute over property, and the prop-
erty involved happens to consist of government bonds, but no distinctive fea-
tures of the government bonds as such are at issue, there would be no occasion
for application of federal law. Thus if a "playboy" set up a trust for a chorus
girl in contemplation of marriage, and the wedding never took place, the ques-
tion whether he could get the bonds back would involve nothing but issues
under State law: the answer would doubtless be the same whether the trust
property consisted of government bonds or real estate, corporate stocks, or
money in bank. 74  But if he purchased government savings bonds in joint
ownership the question whether he or she could cash the bonds would clearly
be a federal question."' Whether, if she had cashed them, she held the pro-
ceeds in constructive -trust for him would probably be, again, a question under
State law.
Before the Bank of America decision, however, one would have supposed
that federal law governed all controversies involving rights and liabilities of
holders and transferees of government bonds where such rights and liabilities
arose by virtue of the distinctive and inherent nature and qualities of govern-
ment obligations as such."'
Perhaps that is still the law. Perhaps the Bank of America decision is
simply a holding that the process of redemption through the channels of the
73 - U.S. at
74 See the cases involving contracts with respect to patents cited in note 20 supra. The issue
in the Bank of America case, as stated by petitioner, was "whether the fact that the property alleged
to have been converted consisted of securities issued or guaranteed by the United States is sufficient,
in and of itself, to require that the liabilities of the-parties in the case be determined in accordance
with federal law." Reply Brief for Petitioner, 5. That formulation, of course, ignores whatever
force the arguments of the Respondent may have. See text at notes 67-72 and 85. The real question was
whether the danger of imposition upon an intermediate "conduit" bank of liability under State law for
conversion of bonds being forwarded for redempton constituted an undue burden upon the exercise of
the constitutionally conferred federal function of issuing and redeeming government bonds. The Su-
preme Courts' opinion indicates that the connection is too remote to constitute such a burden. CI. note
32. If a bank official wrongfully liquidated pledged collateral consisting of government bonds, or filched
such bonds from a customer's safe-deposit box, there would 'be nothing involved but a case of
conversion under State law. Petitioner's formulation would recognize no distinction between that
sort of situation and the transmittal of government bonds through the normal channels of the
Federal Reserve System for redemption.
75 See cases cited in note 49 supra. See also Mudd v. Teague, 220 F. 2d 162, 164 (C.C.A. 8,
1955).
76 Perhaps the Court of Appeals was speaking too broadly when it said without any qualifica-
tion that "where United States bonds are concerned, we must look to federal law to determine not
only the nature of the obligations, rights, and duties of the United States as a party, but also the
rights and duties of holders and transferees of such bonds among each other." 226 F. 2d at 299.
See text at note 52 supra.
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Federal Reserve System is not a sufficiently distinctive feature of government
bonds as such to fall within the operation of the rule. Perhaps the holding
is merely that the redemption process does not begin until the bonds are pre-
sented and placed in the hands of the Federal Reserve Bank which makes pay-
ment, and that intermediate banks and other parties who participate in the
collection procedure are not sufficiently connected with the ultimate trans-
action of final payment and redemption to be embraced within the rules of
federal law governing that event.
2. Indeed, it seems probable that the real weakness of the presenting
bank's case in the Bank of America situation was that the Treasury Regulations
did not cover the transactions in question with sufficiently definite and specific
rules. The statute simply empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to pre-
scribe the "forms," "terms and conditions," and "manner" of issuance of the
bonds.7 He authorized issuance in bearer form with coupons attached. The
Treasury Regulations rendered such bonds negotiable: "United States coupon
bonds and notes are payable to bearer, and title thereto passes by delivery,
without endorsement and without notice to the Treasury Department .
and accordingly payment will be made in due course to the person surrender-
ing them for redemption. . . . The Treasury Department assumes no re-
sponsibility whatever with respect to coupon bonds or notes reported lost or
stolen and enters no stoppages or caveats against their payment, exchange, or
conversion." "8
In other words, the federal regulations extended no further than to make
the bonds negotiable. There was no regulation specifying the nature or ex-
tent of the subsidiary legal safeguards necessary to protect the status of nego-
tiability.
The scheme of federal regulation was not sufficiently "comprehensive" to
cover the transactions incidental to the redemption process in which the inter-
mediate bank participated.
Had there been such detailed regulation, the Court intimates that it would
have been given effect: "We do not mean to imply that . . . it is beyond
the range of federal legislation to deal comprehensively with Government
paper." "
This reservation in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion also indicates that
the constitutional question mentioned in Erie, which counsel for the Bank of
77 12 U.S.C.A. 1463 (c).
78 31 C.F.R. (1949 ed.) 306.3, 306.26, 306.79.
79 - U.S. at . Compare the effect given to the "fairly comprehensive scheme" of
regulations applicable to telegraph companies. See note 32 supra.
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America company had advanced, s" was not given weight by the Court. Obvi-
ously that objection had no more merit in the Bank of America case than it
had had when urged in Clearfield. Under the Erie opinion, there is no want
of federal judicial power unless Congress lacks legislative power. If the sub-
ject matter is one, as here, not "beyond the range of federal legislation," there
is no constitutional obstacle to the application of federal law, even if the lan-
guage in the Erie opinion be given its full face value.8
The Court's reservation likewise leaves unimpaired the holding in cases
such as O'Brien v. Western Union 82 where Congress has occupied the field
by enacting "a fairly comprehensive scheme of regulation." With respect
to the liabilities of intermediate banks handling government bonds in con-
nection with the redemption process, the federal scheme was not considered
sufficiently "comprehensive" to afford the protection of federal law. If there
had been a federal rule specifically dealing with this phase of the redemption
process, it would undoubtedly have superseded State law as to liability for
conversion by an intermediate bank acting in good faith as a "conduit" in that
process."
Similarly, the line of cases applying "federal common law" in situations
falling within the "sweep" of a federal policy remain unimpaired." The
intermediate bank in the Bank of America case simply failed to establish the
existence of such a federal policy within the "sweep" of which it could find
shelter. The Supreme Court was not impressed with the arguments that ap-
plication of State law would frustrate the federal policy of maintaining the
free negotiability of government coupon bonds."
80 Brief for Petitioner, 12-13.
81 See note 12 supra.
82 See note 32 supra.
83 Petitioner contended that State law must apply because the cause of action was "the ordinary
tort action for conversion," and was "based upon ownership of property and unlawful interference
with the exclusive right of possession which flows from that ownership." Brief for Petitioner, 18.
But the tort action for wrongful death in Francis v. Southern Pacific Co., 333 U.S. 445 (1948),
was equally a State-created run-of-mine cause of action. But the Supreme Court held that the matter
of tort liability for wrongful death of a passenger who was traveling on a free pass was governed
by federal law, to-wit the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act regarding the issuance of free
passes by interstate carriers, and that there was no room for the application of the Erie doctrine.
In fact the famous case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 2, 217-21 (1824), was one where the
plaintiffs sought to assert a State-created cause of action 'based upon interference with their owner-
ship of property, namely a monopolistic franchise to operate certain boats in New York waters.
But the defendants had a federal license authorizing navigation in those waters, and relied success-
fully upon the superior authority of their license as a defense.
84 See text at notes 20-37 supra.
85 See text at notes 67-72 supra for these arguments. The Court regarded these as "specula-
tive" and "remote." - U.S. at . On this point petitioner had submitted these forceful
contentions: "The remoteness of any interest of the United States. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is predicated upon three assumptions, viz: (i) that the United States has an interest (unde-
fined) in the outcome of litigation between 'holders of Government bonds; (ii) that in order to
protect this interest, there must be uniformity in the determination of the rights of owners as
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Accordingly, it would seem that banking circles should press for the enact-
ment of federal statutes or regulations according suitable protection to inter-
mediate banks which participate as "conduits" in the process of forwarding
government coupon bonds for redemption.86 Logic and reason would dictate
that in fairness a bank which handles such bonds in good faith ought not to
be liable for conversion of the bonds forwarded for redemption when it would
not be liable if it had purchased them for its own portfolio instead of merely
serving (usually gratuitously) as a "conduit" for the convenience of its cus-
tomer." .
Neither the convenience of the investing public nor the interest of the
government as a borrower would be served if banks out of caution were obliged
to discontinue such service and holders of government coupon bonds were re-
quired to present them directly to the Treasury at Washington or at one of the
eighteen Federal Reserve Banks located in large cities throughout the nation.
Adequate protection should be given to banks affording their patrons, in rural
as well as metropolitan areas, the customary banking facilities for presenting
government bonds in due course for redemption.
3. With respect to government checks, the precise subject-matter of Clear-
field, it is now; extremely doubtful what law would apply to a controversy be-
tween indorsers inter sese but involving rights and liabilities on the instrument
itself (as distinguished from torts, contracts, trusts, and similar extrinsic trans-
actions where the instrument is merely the form taken by the assets in dis-
pute) 88
against transferees of such bonds; and (iii) that such uniformity will be attained if these rights
are determined by federal decisional law rather than state statutory law. It is submitted that all
three assumptions are unsound, and that the decision introduces uncertainty and confusion which
may actually work against the interest of the United States.
If the United States has in fact any substantial interest in the outcome of litigation between
private parties who deal in its bonds, the proper and effective way to achieve uniformity of result
would be to-state the rule deemed proper in a statute or appropriate regulation. This has not been
done. The-only statute relating to the bonds authorizes their issue and is completely silent as to
the rights of owners and transferees, except that it is provided that the bonds are to be free of cer-
tain taxes. The United States Treasury Department Regulations are equally silent so far as the rights
of owners and transferees are concerned. These regulations set forth in considerable detail the pro-
cedures followed by the Treasury Department in making payments on the public debt and are very
careful to point out that the Treasury Department cannot undertake to protect owners of lost or
stolen coupon bonds or notes. They do not purport to touch upon the rights of owners and trans-
ferees as among themselves." Brief for Petitioner, 24-25.
88 Such legislation would be comparable to that protecting banks with regard to collection of
checks, deposits to the individual accounts of fiduciaries, and similar matters.
87 Indeed, the weight of authority under State law seems to protect from liability for conver-
sion a "conduit" bank acting in good faith. Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256 (1918); Gruntal
v. U.S.F.&G. Co., 254 N.Y. 468 (1930); First Natl. Bank v. Goldberg, 340 Pa. 337 (1941). Cf.
Kimball v. Billings, 55 Me. 147, 152 (1867); Smith v. Harlow, 64 Me. 510, 516-17 (1874). Com-
pare also the trend toward relieving an auctioneer or carrier from liability for conversion of chat-
tels. 'WARREN, TROVER AND CONVERSION, 90-92 (1936); U.S. v. Matthews, 139 F.Supp. 683 (N.D.
Calif. 1956). Cf. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 83 (1881).
88 See text at note 74 supra.
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While the clear field of Clearfield's operation is now reduced to disputes
involving "the rights and duties of the United States," the present writer
believes that suits between private parties involving rights and liabilities on
the instrument itself would probably in some cases present "appropriate situa-
tions" for the application of federal law because of "the presence of a federal
interest" of sufficient magnitude and directness.8" For "Federal law of course
governs the interpretation of the rights and obligations created by the Gov-
ernment bonds themselves," " and such a suit might involve rights and obli-
gations of that character. Such rights and obligations need not be obligations
owed by or towards the United States itself, but might subsist between private
parties inter sese. It is requisite only that they be "created" by the instrument
itself, rather than by an extrinsic transaction.
The Bank of America case apparently does not involve any resurrection
of the pre-Clearfield doctrines espoused by government counsel in the Guaranty
Trust case.9" Although the opinion in Clearfield does not expressly overrule
that case, but emphasizes that the check there involved was something in the
nature of a "foreign bill" to be sent outside the United States,9" it is obvious
that the case was superseded by the Clearfield decision. It was in reliance on
Guaranty Trust that the lower court made the ruling reversed in Clearfield."'
The result of the Bank of America decision seems to be that the line of
distinction between the spheres of federal and State law, the boundary between
the respective domains of Clearfield and Erie, has been confused rather than
clarified as the consequence of this adjudication. Further litigation has been
invited rather than discouraged. It will be necessary for the Court on future
occasions to determine, with less vagueness than the instant opinion displays,
what constitutes a "federal interest, to be governed by federal law." 94 The
"unclouded explicitness" said to inhere in the Clearfield ruling '5 is not enough.
Absence of clouds, without the presence of the sun, does not give light. There
is need for further illumination of this twilight zone by the resplendent rays
of judicial effulgence.
89 See text at note 73 supra.
90 - U.S. at
91 See note 46 supra.
92 318 U.S. at 367.
93 U.S. v. Clearfield Trust Co., 130 F. 2d 93, 94 (C.C.A. 3, 1942). Brief for Petitioner,
20-22, relies on Guaranty Trust, and conflict with that case was advanced as a ground for certiorari.
Petition for Writs of Certiorari, 9-11.
94 - U.S. at
95 - U.S. at
1957.]

